Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories. Turing progressions based on n-provability give rise to a Πn+1 proof-theoretic ordinal. As such, to each theory U we can assign the sequence of corresponding Πn+1 ordinals |U |n n>0. We call this sequence a Turing-Taylor expansion of a theory.
Introduction
Alan Turing considered in his dissertation progressions that are based on transfinitely adding consistency statements ( [14] ). If we disregard for the moment subtle coding and representation issues, these Turing progressions starting with some base theory T were defined by Using stronger notions of provability this can be generalized. We shall use [n] T to denote a formalization of "provable in T together with all true Π 0 n sentences" and n T will denote the dual consistency notion. Generalized Turing progressions are readily defined: Likewise, we can define the Π 0 n proof-theoretical ordinal of a theory U w.r.t. some base theory T :
|U | Π 0 n := sup{α | T n α ⊆ U }. U. Schmerl proved in [13] that |PA| Π 0 n = ε 0 for all n ∈ ω and Beklemishev showed ( [1, 2, 3] ) how provability logics can naturally be employed to perform and simplify the computations to obtain these ordinals.
In this paper we shall see how various theories can be written as the finite union of Turing progressions in a way reminiscent of how C ∞ functions can be written as a countable sum of monomials in their Taylor expansion. Hence, we shall speak of Turing-Taylor expansions of arithmetical theories.
Arithmetical preliminaries
We need to formalize various arguments that use cut-elimination. To this end, we assume that the base theory proves the totality of the hyper-exponential function x → 2 y . However, we also need that our base theories are of low logical complexity aka, that the axioms are of logical complexity at most Π 0 1 . To this end, we shall assume that any theory T will be in a language that contains a function symbol for the hyper-exponentiation and that the recursive equations for this hyper-exponentiation are amongst the axioms of T .
After having fixed our language, we define the arithmetical hierarchy syntactically as usual: ∆ 0 formulas are those formulas that only employ bounded quantification (i.e., quantification of the form ∀ x<t where t is some term not containing x); If φ ∈ Π n (Σ n resp.), then ∃ x φ ∈ Σ n+1 (Π n+1 resp.).
Since T has a constant for hyper-exponentiation, T will be able to prove the totality of hyper-exponentiation in a trivial way using induction for ∆ 0 formulas. It is folklore that ∆ 0 induction can be axiomatized in a Π 1 fashion: Lemma 2.1. Over Robinson's arithmetic Q the following two schemes are equivalent
Proof. The only non-trivial direction is (1) ⇒ (2) which follows by applying (1) to
In the paper we shall heavily use formalized provability and the corresponding provability logics. As such, for c.e. theories T we fix natural formalizations [n] T of "provable in T together with all true Π n sentences" of complexity Σ n+1 and the dual consistency notion n T of complexity Π n+1 . When the context allows us to, we shall drop mention of the base theory T and moreover, instead of writing [0] ( 0 ) we often write (♦).
We shall typically refrain from distinguishing a formula φ from its Gödel number or even a natural syntactical term denoting its Gödel number. Also, we use the standard dot notation φ(ẋ) to denote a formula with free variable x so that for each x the formula φ(ẋ) is provably equivalent to n where n is the Gödel number of φ(t) where t is some term (often called numeral) denoting x. Note that for non-standard x, the corresponding term denoting x will also be non-standard. A main result about formalized provability is formulated in what is nowadays called Löb's rule ( [12] ):
The natural way to prove statements about Turing progression is by transfinite induction. Weaker theories however cannot prove transfinite induction. Schmerl ( [13] ) introduced a way to circumvent transfinite induction employing so-called reflexive transfinite induction. Lemma 2.3 (Reflexive transfinite induction). Let T be some theory extending say, EA, so that
Then it holds that T ⊢ ∀α φ(α).
and the result follows from Löb's rule.
For theories U and V , we shall write U ≡ n V for the statement that U and V prove the same Π n+1 formulas.
Modal preliminaries
We shall see that the polymodal provability logic GLP ω is particularly well-suited to speak about Turing progressions and finite unions thereof. A standing assumption throughout all this paper is that all theories that we consider yield soundness of GLP ω . Moreover, we shall assume that any theory T contains EA + and has a set of axioms whose set of Gödel numbers is definable on the standard model by a ∆ 0 formula.
Provability logics
The closed fragment GLP 0 ω of GLP ω consists of all those GLP ω theorems that do not contain propositional variables. We define worms to be the collection of iterated consistency statements within GLP 0 ω and denote them by W: Definition 3.2. For each n < ω, the empty worm ⊤ is in W n ; We inductively define that if A ∈ W n and ω > m ≥ n, then m A ∈ W n . The set W of all GLP ω worms is just W 0 .
Often we shall just identify a worm with the string of subsequent modality indices denoting the empty string by ⊤ for convenience. It is well-known (e.g. [3] ) that worms constitute an alternative ordinal notation system if we order them by
Here, W/ ≡ denotes W n modulo GLP ω provable equivalence and ε 0 , < is just the ordinal ε 0 = sup{ω, ω ω , ω ω ω , . . .} under the usual ordinal ordering <. Worms can be related smoothly to more standard ordinal notations using the so-called hyper-exponentiation functions e n : On → On where On denotes the class of ordinals and e 0 is the identity function; e 1 : ξ → −1 + ω ξ ; and e n+m = e n • e m . The following theorem is proven in [7] :
Here, n ↑ A denotes the worm that arises by simultaneously substituting any modality m in A by n + m. Further, we define o n (n ↑ A) = o 0 (A). We now have that o n : W n / ≡, < n ∼ = ε 0 , < .
Lost in translation
In previous papers on polymodal provability logics, various proofs are rather involved since they work with classical ordinal notation systems. Worms have further logical and algebraic structure so that in the context of provability logics and Turing progressions, they are the better ordinal notation systems. 
More on worms
We shall define a convenient decomposition of worms that will allow for inductive proofs.
Definition 3.6. For a GLP ω worm A, its n-head -we write h n (A)-is the leftmost part of A that consists of only modalities which are at least n. The remaining part of A is called the n-remainder and is denoted by r n (A).
More formally: h n (⊤) = ⊤; and h n (mA) = mh n (A) in case m ≥ n and ⊤ otherwise. Likewise: r n (⊤) = ⊤ and r n (mA) = r n (A) in case m ≥ n and mA otherwise.
The following lemma whose proof we leave as an exercise turns out to be very useful.
Lemma 3.7. For each GLP ω -worm A and for each n < ω, we have
Turing Taylor expansions
We shall see that various theories can be written as the finite union of Turing progressions. We start by looking at theories axiomatized by worms.
Worms and Turing progressions
The generalized Turing progressions T n A are not too sensitive to adding "small" elements to the base theory as is expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For any theory T and for any σ ∈ Σ n+1 , we have
In particular, for any theory T and for any GLP ω worm A, if m < n < ω, then
Proof. By a straight-forward reflexive transfinite induction using provable Σ n+1 -completeness at the inductive step: for n < ω and σ ∈ Σ n+1 , we have
The main motor to relate provability logics to Turing progression is by means of the following theorem. 
Proof. By reflexive transfinite induction. We refer to [3] , Theorem 17 for details.
In general we do of course not have 1 that if U ≡ n V , then U +ψ ≡ n V +ψ for theories U and V and formulas ψ. However, in the case of Turing progression we can include "small" additions on both sides and preserve conservativity.
Lemma 4.3. Let T some theory whose axioms have logical complexity at most Π n+1 and let A be some worm in W n . Moreover, let B be any worm and m < n.
We have, verifiably in T , that
Proof. As m < n we have that mB ∈ Π n . Whence, we can apply Theorem 4.2 to the theory T + mB and obtain From this lemma we obtain the following simple but very useful corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let T be some theory whose axioms have logical complexity at most Π n+1 . Moreover, let A be any worm. We have verifiably in T that
Proof. Since GLP ⊢ A ↔ h n (A) ∧ r n (A) and since by assumption GLP ω is sound w.r.t. T we see that T + A ≡ T + h n (A) + r n (A. The worm r n (A) is either empty or of the form mA for some m < n. Clearly, h n (A) ∈ W n . Thus, we can apply Lemma 4.3 and obtain
1 It is well-known that PRA + ¬IΣ 1 and IΣ 1 are Π 0 2 equivalent (see [11] , Lemma 3.4). Clearly, PRA + ¬IΣ 1 + IΣ 1 ≡ 1 IΣ 1 .
Theories axiomatized by worms
From Theorem 4.2 we see that we can capture the Π Proof. It suffices to prove the second item since for any worm A, we have h i (A) = ⊤ for i large enough. We prove the second item by induction on n and the base case follows directly from Theorem 4.2.
For the inductive case we reason as follows. By Corollary 4.4 we know that
In particular, as T n+1 hn+1(A) + r n+1 (A) ⊆ Π n+2 we see that actually, T + A is a Π n+2 -conservative extension of T n+1 hn+1(A) + r n+1 (A), and
The induction hypothesis tells us that
Again, since
Conversely, assume that T + A ⊢ π for some Π n+2 sentence π. By (1) we see that T n+1 hn+1(A) + r n+1 (A) ⊢ π. However, r n+1 (A) ∈ Π n+1 and T + A ⊢ r n+1 (A) so, by (2) we see that
as was required.
In order to obtain a generalization of Theorem 4.5 for worms A in 2 GLP Λ for recursive Λ > ω one first would need suitable (hyper)arithmetical interpretations for which GLP Λ is sound and complete. In [6] the authors show that such an interpretation exists. A next step would be to establish the necessary conservation properties. However, the modal reasoning for Theorem 4.5 entirely carries over to the more general setting of GLP Λ .
As a nice corollary to Theorem 4.5 we get the following simple but useful lemma. The restriction on the complexity of T can actually be dropped as was shown in [13, 5] .
Ignatiev's model and Turing-Taylor progressions
In this section we shall focus for the moment on sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic. We shall see that if such a theory can be written as the finite union of generalized Turing progressions, then it can be seen as "an element" of Ignatiev's universal model for the closed fragment GLP 0 ω .
Ignatiev's universal model
We refer to the standard literature ([8, 10, 4]) for details and limit ourselves here to defining the model in terms of worm sequences rather than in terms of ordinal sequences. We can represent each world in Ignatiev's model for GLP ω by a sequence of ordinals, α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . . with α n+1 ≤ ℓ(α n ).
where ℓ(α + ω β ) = β and ℓ(0) = 0. Equivalently, we can represent each world by a sequence of worms:
We denote the collection of worlds in Ignatiev's model by I ω .
Turing-Taylor expansions
To each sub-theory U of PA that extends EA + , we can associate a the sequence of ordinals:
of the proof-theoretical ordinals of U w.r.t. EA + . We shall denote this sequence also by tt(U ). .
In case U ≡ tt(U ) we say that U has a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion.
We included the reference to Taylor in the name due to the analogy to Taylor expansions of C ∞ functions, that is, functions that are infinitely many times differentiable. If f is a C ∞ function, one can consider its Taylor expansion around 0 as f (x) = ∞ n=0 a n x n . Thus, each Taylor expansion is determined by by its sequence a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . of coefficients. In the case of a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion we fully determine the expansion by a sequence of ordinals ξ 0 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . so that
We shall study which sequences of ordinals are attainable as coming from a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion.
Note that we have defined tt(U ) as to include only Π 0 n sentences but this can easily be generalized to suitable sentences of higher complexities. For our current purpose, studying sub-theories of PA, the restriction is not essential.
For Taylor expansions there is actually a uniform way of computing the coefficients as f (x) = ∞ n=0
x n where f (n) denotes the n-th derivative of f and f (0) := f . For theories axiomatized by worms there we saw in Theorem 4.5 that there is also such a uniform way of computing the coefficients.
Note that the analogy to Taylor expansions is by no means perfect. In particular, in Taylor expansions we see that all the monomials x n are mutually independent, whereas in Turing progressions there will be certain dependency as we already saw in Lemma 4.6.
With every sequence α = α 0 , α 1 , . . . of ordinals below ε 0 we can naturally associate a sub theory ( α) tt of PA as follows
Of course we can and shall write the α n most of the times as worms A n in W n . In general, we do not have that tt(( A) tt ) = A. Let us first see this in a concrete example and then prove some general theorems in the next sections. Using Proposition 3.4 one gets the correspondence to the more familiar ordinal notation system.
Each Turing-Taylor expansion corresponds to a unique point in Ignatiev's model
We shall now prove that for each theory U we have that tt(U ) is a sequence that occurs in I ω . Most of the work in doing so is included in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Let T be some Π n+1 axiomatized theory and let A ∈ W n+1 and B ∈ W n . We have, verifiably in T , that
and
Proof. Since B ∈ W n , by Theorem 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 we know that
Consequently, we obtain the following equivalence.
Let us now see the following conservation result which proves the first part of the theorem.
By (3) it suffices to show that
since nB ∈ Π 0 n+1 . Thus we can reason
This proves (4) and also T Suppose now for a contradiction that A does not satisfy the condition that
The latter violates the assumption that |U | Π 0 n = A n is the supremum of all B so that T n B ⊆ U . We note that the assumption A ≥ n+1 h n+1 B does not give us any information about the relations ≥ n+m with m > 1 at different coordinates in the Ignatiev sequence as these signs can switch arbitrarily. For example, let A = 220222 and B = 2122. We have that
Each point in
The next lemma takes care of the case A ≤ n+1 h n+1 (B).
Lemma 5.6. Let T be some Π n+1 -axiomatized theory. Moreover, let A ∈ W n+1 , B ∈ W n and suppose A ≤ n+1 h n+1 (B). Then, verifiably in T , we have
Proof. One direction is immediate so we assume that T On the other hand, T + B ≡ n T n B so that if T n+1 A + T n B ⊢ π, then T + B ⊢ π whence also T n B ⊢ π quot erat demonstrandum. Suppose that U ≡ n V . As mentioned before, in general we do not have that U + T ≡ n V + T . However, we do have the following easy but useful lemma.
Lemma 5.7. (In EA + ) Suppose U ≡ n V and T ⊆ Σ n+1 , then also U + T ≡ n V + T .
